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Abstract 
 There is a long-standing and widespread consensus that semi-
presidentialism is bad for democratic performance. This article examines 
whether there is empirical evidence to support the arguments against semi-
presidentialism. Examining countries that incompletely consolidated and yet not 
autocratic, we identify the relationship between democratic performance and the 
three main arguments against semi-presidentialism – the strength of the 
presidency, cohabitation and divided minority government. We find that there is 
a strong and negative association between presidential power and democratic 
performance, but that cohabitation and divided minority government do not 
have the negative consequences that the literature predicts. 
 
 Introduction 
In Afghanistan in January 2004, members of the Constitutional Loya Jurga 
approved a new constitution. As late as September 2003 the draft constitution 
had included provision for a semi-presidential system with both a directly 
elected president and a prime minister responsible to the Wolesi Jirga, the lower 
house of the Afghan National Assembly (Rubin 2004: 12). In the end, a pure 
presidential system was recommended. There were political interests at stake in 
the choice of the system (ibid.). However, there were concerns about problems 
supposedly inherent in semi-presidentialism. One of the participants in the 
drafting procedure summed up the reasons why presidentialism was chosen 
ahead of semi-presidentialism: “There would be no uncertainty about who held 
executive power in Kabul, and Washington would retain the benefit of having a 
clearly identifiable Afghan partner …” (ibid.). 
The decision to reject semi-presidentialism in Afghanistan is symptomatic 
of the standard academic wisdom about the impact of this form of government 
on the process of democratisation: semi-presidentialism should be avoided at all 
costs. The direct election of the president can lead to a dangerous personalisation 
of the political process; the problem of dual legitimacy can be problematic when 
there is a divided executive, especially if the president and prime minister are 
from opposing forces; the absence of a majority in parliament can lead either the 
president or prime minister to ignore the rule of law in order to assert ‘effective’ 
decision making. In the context of these criticisms, Timothy Colton and Cindy 
Skach have recently summed up the academic consensus about semi-
presidentialism. They write that it is time for ”fragile democracies that suffer 
from the semi-presidential predicament to rethink [their] constitutional 
framework” (Skach 2005: 124-125). 
This article examines whether there is empirical evidence to support the 
arguments against semi-presidentialism. To date, there has been no rigorous test 
of these arguments. Instead, the evidence has remained largely qualitative. In 
this article, we examine whether semi-presidentialism has had a negative impact 
on democratic performance. We assume that semi-presidentialism is unlikely to 
have had such an effect in two situations – when a country is completely 
consolidated and when a country is autocratic. In these situations, we assume 
that other non-institutional factors cancel out any effects of semi-presidentialism 
on democratic performance. However, for countries that remain incompletely 
consolidated and yet not autocratic we might expect semi-presidential 
institutions to significantly affect democracy. Focusing only on countries with 
semi-presidential constitutions and using Polity’s measures to identify the 
countries in this category that are incompletely consolidated and yet not 
autocratic, we identify the relationship between democratic performance and the 
three main arguments against semi-presidentialism – the strength of the 
presidency, cohabitation and divided minority government. We find that there is 
a strong and negative association between presidential power and democratic 
performance, but that cohabitation and divided minority government do not 
have the negative consequences that the literature predicts. 
 The main finding of this article is important. It shows that some of the 
prevailing wisdom about semi-presidentialism is wrong. Specifically, there is no 
evidence to support two of the three main arguments against this form of 
government. By contrast, the findings do support one of the arguments against 
semi-presidentialism. Semi-presidential countries with strong presidents 
perform worse than those with weaker presidents. This finding is also 
significant. While this study does not allow us to draw any conclusions about the 
performance of semi-presidentialism relative to that of parliamentarism or 
presidentialism, it does suggest that if, for whatever reason, countries decide to 
adopt semi-presidentialism, they would be advised to adopt a form of semi-
presidentialism where the president has very few powers. Thus, while 
Afghanistan may have been right to reject semi-presidentialism, in the context 
where countries wish to adopt this constitutional system or where they have no 
choice but to adopt it, then advice can still be given that can lessen the problems 
of semi-presidentialism. 
 
The problems of semi-presidentialism 
In semi-presidential systems, the president is directly elected and serves 
for a fixed term, while the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible 
solely to the legislature. The academic consensus against semi-presidentialism is 
profound. For example, Linz states that: “In view of some of the experiences with 
this type of system it seems dubious to argue that in and by itself [semi-
presidentialism] can generate democratic stability” (ibid: 55). Valenzuela (2004: 
17) argues that semi-presidentialism “may not solve some of the inherent 
problems of presidentialism, and indeed could make them worse by reifying the 
conflict between two state powers and personalizing them in the figure of the 
president and the prime minister”. Stepan and Suleiman recommend against 
semi-presidentialism arguing that it “is a more risk-prone system than the 
modern parliamentarism that has evolved in Europe other than France after 
World War II” (Stepan and Suleiman 1995: 412). 
In this article, there is no attempt to compare the performance of countries 
with semi-presidential constitutions relative to those with parliamentary and/or 
presidential constitutions. Thus, we do not aim to contribute to the more general 
debate as to whether parliamentarism should be chosen ahead of both semi-
presidentialism and presidentialism as the standard wisdom suggests.   
However, we seek to  contribute to the literature by assessing the extent to which 
the problems of semi-presidentialsim apply to different semi-presidential 
regimes.  There are three main arguments against semi-presidentialism. 
 
The problem of over-presidentialisation in semi-presidential countries 
The first argument against semi-presidentialism is similar to a criticism of 
presidentialism. The direct election of the president may encourage the 
personalisation of the political process and it may encourage the president to 
disregard the rule of law because s/he feels above the normal political process. 
Presidents can claim to have a mandate from the people – no matter how close 
their winning margin may have been. This mandate, they might argue, gives 
them the authority to act in the best interests of the country, as they see it, and 
may encourage them to ignore any opposition. Linz expresses this concern when 
discussing semi-presidential systems in which the president has considerable 
powers. In this situation, he worries that semi-presidentialism can come to 
resemble “a constitutional dictatorship” (Linz 1994: 48). A further potential 
problem with direct election is that it may encourage political outsiders to seek 
election. If successful, such presidents tend to ignore political parties and 
personalise the presidential process. The survival of the regime becomes 
associated with the survival of the president in office. Opposition to the 
president becomes associated with opposition to the regime itself. Again, Linz 
worries about this problem of semi-presidentialism and states that “as much or 
more than a pure presidential system, a dual executive system depends on the 
personality and abilities of the president” (ibid: 52). For his part, Lijphart has 
argued that semi-presidential systems “actually make it possible for the 
president to be even more powerful that in most pure presidential systems” 
(2004: 102). The combination of a president with strong constitutional powers 
backed by a loyal parliamentary majority and a submissive prime minister can 
mean that there will be few if any checks and balances within and between the 
executive and legislative branches of government. In this event, the president 
may exercise untrammelled power and in the context of a nascent democracy 
such an extreme personalisation of the political process has the potential to be 
destabilising. 
 
The problem of a divided executive in semi-presidential countries 
The second argument against semi-presidentialism is also similar to a 
criticism of presidentialism, namely the problem of dual legitimacy, but it 
provides a distinct semi-presidential twist to this problem. In presidential 
systems, problems may arise when the majority in the assembly is opposed to the 
president. In this case, each institution is pitted against the other and deadlock 
ensues. When it does, the president may try to reassert decision-making 
authority by abusing the rule of law or the military may take it upon themselves 
to intervene. In semi-presidential systems, problems may also arise when the 
majority in the assembly is opposed to the president. In this case, though, there is 
deadlock between the president and the prime minister rather than between the 
president and the legislature. In semi-presidential systems, this problem of a 
divided executive is known as cohabitation. Linz and Stepan (1996: 286) identify 
the circumstances when the effects of cohabitation may be problematic: 
When supporters of one or the other component of semi-
presidentialism feel that the country would be better off if one 
branch of the democratically legitimated structure of rule would 
disappear or be closed, the democratic system is endangered and 
suffers an overall loss of legitimacy, since those questioning one or 
the other will tend to consider the political system undesirable as 
long as the side they favor does not prevail. 
In these circumstances, they argue that “policy conflicts often express themselves 
as a conflict between two branches of democracy” (ibid: 287). Each actor claims 
to be the legitimate authority and tries to assume power at the expense of the 
other. Naturally enough, democracy as a whole can suffer. 
 In fact, the problem of a divided executive under semi-presidentialism is 
compounded by the worry that intra-executive conflict may not be confined to 
periods of cohabitation. For Linz, semi-presidential systems are inherently 
problematic: “The result inevitably is a lot of politicking and intrigues that may 
delay decision making and lead to contradictory policies due to the struggle 
between the president and prime minister” (Linz 1994: 55). In this regard, Linz is 
particularly concerned about the relationship between the executive and the 
military. In semi-presidential systems there may be three or even four major 
actors: the president, the prime minister, the minister for defence and the joint 
chief of staff of the armed forces. In this situation, he states: “The hierarchical line 
that is so central to military thinking acquires a new complexity” (ibid: 57). This 
complexity leaves room for “constitutional ambiguities regarding one of the 
central issues of many democracies: the subordination of the military to the 
democratically elected authorities and hopefully to civilian supremacy” (ibid: 
59). As we have seen, the absence of single point of contact is a reason why semi-
presidentialism was rejected in Afghanistan. 
 
The problem of divided minority government in semi-presidential countries 
The third argument against semi-presidentialism is closer to a problem usually 
associated with parliamentarism. In her work, Cindy Skach identifies this 
problem as ‘divided minority government’. She defines this situation as the case 
where “neither the president nor the prime minister, nor any party or coalition, 
enjoys a substantive majority in the legislature” (Skach 2005: 15). She says that 
this situation “can predictably lead to an unstable scenario, characterized by 
shifting legislative coalitions and government reshuffles, on the one hand, and 
continuous presidential intervention and use of reserved powers, on the other” 
(ibid: 17-18). In turn, the situation can deteriorate: “The greater the legislative 
immobilism, governmental instability, and cabinet reshuffling resulting from the 
minority position of the government, the more justified or pressured the 
president may feel to use their powers beyond their constitutional limit, for a 
prolonged period of time” (ibid: 18). In other words, while the scenario is 
different from cohabitation, the result is the same. When the executive is 
weakened, in this case because of the absence of either a stable presidential or 
prime ministerial parliamentary majority, directly elected presidents feel the 
need to assert their control over the system and the process of democratisation 
suffers. 
 
Seemingly, therefore, there are good theoretical reasons to suggest that 
semi-presidentialism is problematic. To date, though, the arguments against 
semi-presidentialism remain largely untested. In the one statistical study of the 
performance of semi-presidentialism relative to that of parliamentarism and 
presidentialism, Moestrup (2007) has identified important regional differences. 
Specifically, she finds that while “semi-presidential regimes on average have 
performed worse than other regime types in the Americas and Asia, they appear 
to have performed … better than parliamentary systems in Eastern Europe” 
(Moestrup 2007: 39). For the most part, though, evidence to support the 
arguments against semi-presidentialism is largely qualitative. For example, Linz 
and Stepan argue that divided government was particularly difficult for Poland 
in the years immediately following democratisation. They state: “Because of 
party fragmentation and its dualistic deadlock, Poland’s efforts to advance 
toward a balanced budget and a mixed economy stalled” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 
282). In her work, Skach has suggested that divided minority government 
contributed to the collapse of democracy in Weimar Germany and that it is one 
of the causes of the problems of democracy in contemporary Russia: “It was 
during the intense crisis period of divided minority government in 1993 that 
Yeltsin took Russia largely out of the democratic box, and pushed through a 
constitution that boosted the power of the presidency” (Colton and Skach 2005: 
122). Finally, a study of Guinea-Bissau has suggested that semi-presidentialism 
may have been a better choice than pure presidentialism. However, the authors 
conclude that “it is the highly presidentialised nature of the system rather than 
the system itself that is problematic” (Azevedo and Nijzink 2007: 158). In the next 
section, we test whether there is robust empirical evidence to support the 
arguments against semi-presidentialism. 
 
Sample, hypotheses, variables, model specification and 
findings 
 In this article, semi-presidentialism is defined as the situation where there 
is a directly elected president and a prime minister and cabinet who are 
responsible to the legislature. This is now a common way of defining this type of 
system. (See for example, Elgie 2005; Skach 2005; Shugart 2005; 2006). It should 
be noted that this definition makes no reference to the powers of the president. 
Therefore, a country like Ireland with a figurehead president, but nonetheless a 
directly elected president, should be classed as semi-presidential as well as a 
country like Russia with a very powerful directly elected president. In one sense, 
such a definition seems counterintuitive. However, there are at least two reasons 
for adopting this definition. Firstly, a definition that includes reference to the 
powers of the president leads to a problem of selection bias. If the list of semi-
presidential countries includes only those countries with at least moderately 
powerful countries, then it is hardly surprising that semi-presidentialism is 
associated with the standard problems of presidentialisation. By defining semi-
presidentialism without reference to the powers of the president, we avoid any 
problem of selection bias. Certainly, it means that we should not operationalise 
semi-presidentialism as a discrete explanatory variable. However, it also means 
that we can explore the effects of variation within semi-presidentialism. To what 
extent does this variation matter? We hypothesise that it does matter and that 
semi-presidential countries with stronger presidents are likely to perform worse 
than those with weaker presidents. Secondly, it must be acknowledged that some 
countries choose to have directly elected presidents with very few powers. These 
countries choose to operate in a parliamentary-like manner, but, for whatever 
reason, they also choose to directly elect their president. This is a discrete 
constitutional choice and it is a choice that is different from a parliamentary 
system with an indirectly elected president or a monarch. Are there benefits to 
combining a directly elected and weak president and a strictly parliamentary 
system? We hypothesise that such countries may perform better than those that 
choose to combine a directly elected and powerful president with a government 
that is responsible to the legislature. 
To identify a semi-presidential country on the basis of our definition, it is 
necessary simply to read the country’s constitution. This means that there is very 
little room for the list of semi-presidential countries to vary from one writer to 
the next. There is no need to make a call as how powerful a country’s president 
must be in order for it to be classed as semi-presidential. Instead, it is simply 
necessary to identify those countries that have both a directly elected president  
and a prime minister and cabinet that are responsible to the legislature. That 
said, there are still some judgment calls to be made. For example, we exclude 
countries such as South Korea, where the legislature has to consent to the 
individual appointment of the prime minister, rather like the case of cabinet 
nominations in the US, and where, once appointed, the legislature has no means 
to dismiss the government. All the same, we ensure that our findings are not 
sensitive to case selection on the basis of these and other definitional issues. 
Figure 1 provides a list of countries with semi-presidential constitutions as of 
June 2008. 
 Figure 1 about here 
 Plainly, the list of semi-presidential countries in Figure 1 is very diverse in 
terms of their democratic status. It includes some countries that are 
unequivocally autocratic, such as Chad, other countries that are unequivocally 
consolidated, such as Austria, and others that have started the process of 
democratization but are not yet fully consolidated, such as Madagascar. For the 
purposes of this article, it is assumed that that the purportedly negative 
consequences of semi-presidentialism performance have the chance to ‘kick in’ 
only when a country has reached a certain point of democratization. In other 
words, in an autocracy the institutional effects of semi-presidentialism have no 
room to have a negative influence on democratic performance because the 
political system is so tightly controlled and democratic performance is already so 
poor. By the same token, it is also assumed that the negative consequences of 
semi-presidentialism have no impact on a country that is fully consolidated. In 
these countries, semi-presidentialism may have some or other effect on policy 
outcomes, but the quality of democracy cannot be impaired when democracy is 
‘the only game in town’. Overall, it is assumed that the negative consequences of 
semi-presidentialism will be observable only in countries that remain 
incompletely consolidated and yet are not autocratic. 
 To identify this set of countries within the category of countries with semi-
presidential constitutions, we use the measures of democracy provided by the 
Polity IV project.1 The methodology adopted by Polity is widely used in 
comparative analysis. The Polity project scores countries on a scale from -10 
(complete autocracy) to +10 (complete democracy). This scale cannot be used as a 
continuous measure of democracy.2 However, there are various ways in which 
the scale can be adapted to the research project at hand. The authors of the Polity 
project make a distinction between three categories of countries. Those scoring 
from -10 to -6 inclusive are autocracies; those from -5 to +5 are anocracies; and 
those from +6 to +10 are democracies. Anocracies are transitonal regimes that are 
“about three times more likely to experience major reversions to autocracy than 
democracies” (ibid.). Therefore, a key feature of anocracies is that they are 
relatively unstable and that instability is often associated with a shift to 
autocracy. Other writers have operationalised the Polity scores somewhat 
differently. For example, Przeworski et al (2000) adopted a dichotomous 
distinction between autocracies (-10 to 0 inclusive) and democracies (+1 to +10). 
 In this article, we assume that countries scoring 0 or below are 
insufficiently democratic for semi-presidentialism to have a negative effect on 
democratic performance. Equally, we assume that countries scoring +10 are fully 
consolidated and that again the institutional effects of semi-presidentialism will 
not affect democratic performance. However, within this range the supposed 
perils of semi-presidentialism may have an impact. Figure 2 identifies all 
countries with semi-presidential constitutions that have been placed in the range 
+1 to +9 by Polity. We include countries, such as the Comoros, Congo-
Brazzaville, Moldova and Weimar Germany, which were semi-presidential for a 
period when they scored within that range, but have since abandoned semi-
presidentialism. Each year that a country was semi-presidential and scored in the 
range +1 to+9 is one observation. There are 393 observations in total. This is a 
very unbalanced sample: 36 countries are observed across a period of 86 years.  
The number of years for which countries are observed ranges from one (Belarus) 
to 42 (France). The first country to be observed is Germany from 1919-1932, while 
Timor-Leste does not enter the dataset until 2002. 
Given that we cannot use the Polity measures as a continuous variable, we 
dichotomise the dependent variable to measure the performance of democracy. 
Thus, we distinguish between two categories of countries - those that score in the 
range +1 to +5 inclusive (anocracies) and those that score in the range +6 to +9 
(democracies). We assume that the three purported disadvantages of semi-
presidentialism will be associated with poor democratic performance and, hence, 
with anocracies rather than democracies. In our sample, 32.7 per cent of the 
observations are anocracies. 
 Figure 2 about here 
 We have three explanatory variables. The first explanatory variable is the 
power of the president. We hypothesise that powerful presidents will be 
associated with anocracies rather than democracies. To measure the power of 
presidents, we use the scale proposed by Siaroff (2003). He identifies nine 
constitutional indicators of presidential power. He gives a value of 1 if the 
constitution includes the indicator and 0 otherwise. He then measures the 
powers of presidents cross-nationally within a range of 0 to 9.3 The scores for the 
countries in our sample are given in Figure 2. In a small number of cases, we had 
to measure the power of presidents ourselves because Siaroff did not code them. 
These scores are provided in Table 1. For our sample, the minimum score in 
Siaroff’s schema is 1 because one of his indicators is the direct election of the 
president and all of the countries in our sample will score 1 for this indicator. 
Overall, our sample is skewed towards semi-presidential countries with strong 
presidents: the mean is 5.9 along a range of 1 to 9. 
Table 1 about here 
The second explanatory variable is cohabitation. We hypothesise that 
cohabitation will be associated with anocracies rather than democracies. To 
identify periods of cohabitation, we began the process of identifying periods of 
cohabitation by consulting www.worldstatesmen.org. This is a very thorough 
and reliable data source. It provides the names and terms of office of all 
presidents and prime ministers. It also records their party affiliation. We 
identified all cases when the party affiliation of the two executive actors was 
specifically identified and when it was different. We excluded cases where either 
the president or the prime minister was classed as non-partisan. We then 
consulted secondary sources to confirm whether the cases where the party 
affiliation of the president and the prime minister was different were examples of 
coalition government, namely where the president and prime minister were from 
different parties but where the president’s party was represented in government, 
or cohabitation, the situation where the president and prime minister were from 
opposing parties and where the president’s party was not represented in 
government. Cohabitation is quite rare in our sample: it accounts for only 9.4 per 
cent of 393 observations. 
The third explanatory variable is divided minority government. We 
hypothesise that divided minority government will be associated with anocracies 
rather than democracies. We identified periods of divided minority government 
by consulting the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI).4 This 
dataset has an entry called ‘Majority’. The DPI codebook states that this entry 
records “the fraction of seats held by the government”. It is calculated by 
dividing the number of government seats by the total number of seats in the 
main house of the legislature. When the score for ‘Majority’ was below 50 per 
cent in a given year, we coded the case as a period of minority government. The 
DPI database only goes back to 1975. This range covers most of our examples. 
For pre-1975 cases we use secondary sources to determine whether or not there 
was minority government. In our sample, minority government occurs in 21.1 
per cent of our observations.    
There are six control variables: wealth, population, legislative 
fractionalisation, and ethnic fractionalisation, as well as dummies for Europe and 
the post-Cold War era. We follow the literature in taking the natural logarithm of 
GDP per capita and population as the first two control variables. More wealthy 
countries are expected to be associated with democracies as are those with 
smaller populations. We take data for GDP per capita in 1990 Geary-Khamis 
dollars and population from the Total Economy Database of the University of 
Gröningen Growth and Development Centre 
(http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/totecon.shtml). For missing values and pre-1950 
figures we use Angus Maddison’s data set of Historical Statistics for the World 
Economy (http://www.ggdc.net/Maddison/). In effect, this data set is the 
precursor of the Total Economy Database and there is a very high correlation 
between the two. For Timor-Leste’s population we used the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. There is a wide variation on each of both the GDP and 
population measures. The third control variable is legislative fractionalisation. 
The more fragmented the legislature, the more difficult it is to sustain 
democracy. Therefore, the greater the fractionalisation, the more likely a country 
is to be an anocracy. For this measure, we use the effective number of political 
parties. We rely mainly on Michael Gallagher’s data set 
(http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Doct
s/ElectionIndices.pdf). We also use Sarah Birch’s (2003) calculations for early 
Central and East European elections. We calculated any missing values 
ourselves. The mean figure for ENPP is 3.6 across our 393 observations. Finally, 
we included Alesina et al’s (2003) figures for ethnic fractionalisation, except for 
Timor-Leste where we used the figure for linguistic fractionalisation. Semi-
presidentialism has become much more widespread in the aftermath of the Cold 
War: only 28 per cent of the observations predate 1990. Also, 56 per cent of the 
observations are for European countries. 
We did not opt for full fixed-effects estimation because of the radically 
imbalanced nature of our panel. However, we do test for country effects by 
dropping one by one all of the countries that appear for over ten years in the 
dataset. Our model is a pooled logit with Newey-West standard errors to correct 
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. We present four models in Table 2. 
The first is our basic model and the other three test its robustness to sampling 
and measurement issues. It is worth mentioning the performance of the controls 
included in all equations. As the literature would predict, the wealth variable is 
always a significant predictor of democracy. In contrast to previous studies, a 
larger population is associated with democracy. This effect may be due to the fact 
that micro-states are already excluded from the Polity data set. Unsurprisingly, 
the effective number of parties is associated with anocracy. However, ethnic 
fractionalisation is associated with democracy, although its coefficient is not 
always significant. It seems likely that in our analyses much of the effect of ethnic 
fractionalisation is channelled through the party system. The post-Cold War era 
is always positively and significantly associated with democracy. The results for 
the European dummy are inconsistent across the equations. 
Table 2 about here 
We will now discuss our semi-presidential variables equation by equation. 
As predicted, presidential power is bad for democracy. The presidential power 
coefficient is in the right direction and is highly significant. Logit coefficients are 
difficult to interpret directly. However, we can compare the probabilities for 
different values of the index of presidential power. Taking, an average European 
post-Cold War observation in terms of GDP, population, party system and ethnic 
fragmentation, without divided majority government or cohabitation and the 
maximum level of presidential power, then the probability of democracy is 0.51.  
Holding all else equal but reducing presidential power to the minimum the 
probability of democracy doubles to approach certainty – 0.98.  These figures are 
clearly substantively, as well as statistically, significant. 
By contrast, the cohabitation variable is significantly in the wrong 
direction. The minority government hypothesis is insignificant and in the wrong 
direction. 
We tested the robustness of these conclusions to the inclusion of countries 
in our sample by rerunning the model, while excluding one-by-one all 20 country 
cases that were observed for at least ten years.  None of these exclusions made a 
substantive difference to the models, in terms of significance level and/or sign of 
coefficient, except for Sri Lanka. In model 2, we can see that the exclusion of Sri 
Lanka does not modify our conclusion regarding presidential power. Neither 
does the significantly positive result for divided minority government provide a 
basis for re-evaluating this variable. Nonetheless, model 2 is quite revealing in 
respect of cohabitation. Sri Lanka 2003 is the only observation of cohabitation in 
an anocracy. As we noted already, cohabitation is very rare in semi-presidential 
regimes. It is even more rare outside Europe: Niger, Sri Lanka and Mongolia are 
the only non-European countries to have experienced cohabitation, for one, two 
and three years respectively. In short, we suspect our striking finding on 
cohabitation is more likely a result of its rarity than it operating according to a 
logic, which is radically different to that outlined in the qualitative literature. 
We also investigate the robustness of our models to two measurement 
issues. Sudden shifts in the Polity rating of countries may affect our conclusions. 
For example, according to our measure, described above, a democracy that 
underwent a sudden transition from democracy to autocracy, without going 
through even one year of anocracy would simply drop out of the dataset and no 
decline in democratic performance would be registered. Conversely, a country 
might move directly from anocracy to consolidated democracy without an 
increase being noted. There are seven cases of such sudden regime change in our 
sample (Belarus 1994, Austria 1932 and 1945, Peru 1991, Niger 1995, Germany 
1932 and Finland 1943). We recoded each of these to record a shift to anocracy or 
democracy, as appropriate, before the country exits the dataset. As model 3 
shows, this did not affect our conclusions.   
Finally, we recode Siaroff’s scale of presidential power. The literature 
tends to conceptualise presidential power under semi-presidentialism in terms of 
three ranked categories: strongly, moderately and weakly presidential. We coded 
all countries with scores of over five as strongly presidential, those with scores of 
four or five as moderately presidential, and all those below four as weakly 
presidential. The vast majority of observations are strongly presidential, 22 per 
cent are balanced, while only ten per cent are weakly presidential. The results in 
model 4 support our previous conclusions. Both moderately and weakly 
presidential systems outperform strongly presidential systems and have 
statistically significant coefficients. The dummy for weak presidents is much 
bigger than that for moderately powerful presidents. Taking the same values as 
in our illustration of the presidential power index, the probability of democracy 
in a weakly presidential system is 0.99. In a balanced system, it is 0.86 and in 
strongly presidential systems it is 0.68. 
 
Discussion 
 There are three major arguments against semi-presidentialism. The 
findings in the previous section showed that there was evidence to support one 
of those arguments but not the other two. In countries with a semi-presidential 
constitution, when the powers of the presidency are great, the performance of 
democracy is likely to be less good. However, when there is cohabitation and 
when there is minority government, there is no statistical association with poor 
democratic performance, despite the prevailing academic wisdom. What might 
account for these findings? 
 In semi-presidential countries with strong presidents, there is the 
opportunity for the cumulation of powers in a way that resembles pure 
presidential systems. Under semi-presidentialism, a president who is supported 
by a parliamentary majority is able to appoint a loyal prime minister whose 
constitutional powers can also be called upon to implement the president’s 
agenda. In this event, already enjoying considerable constitutional power in 
his/her own right, the president can exercise further powers indirectly because 
of the acquiescence of the prime minister. Given the supportive majority in the 
legislature, this situation means that there are very few constraints on the 
president’s executive and legislative powers. In this scenario, there is little 
incentive for the president to share power and there is little opportunity for the 
opposition to have any influence over decision making. By contrast, there is 
plenty of opportunity for the president to pursue a self-interested agenda to the 
detriment of the quality of democracy. There is evidence to suggest that this 
situation is at least partly responsible the problems of democratic consolidation 
in countries like Peru in the early 1900s, Mozambique, Namibia and Tanzania. 
That said, the association between strong presidents and poor democratic 
performance needs to be placed in context. While the association may be strong 
statistically, there is always the possibility that the problems experienced by 
countries with strong presidents may pre-date the adoption of semi-
presidentialism. In other words, strong semi-presidential presidents may not be 
the cause of poor democratic performance. Instead, poor democratic 
performance may be endogenous to the selection of this form of semi-
presidentialism. For example, Mozambique, Namibia and Tanzania all began the 
process of democratisation in the context of systems in which one party was 
dominant and where strong and/or historic leaders were already in power. In 
this context, while the maintenance of an anocracy with some democratic 
credentials may still be a remarkable achievement, the inability to establish a full 
democracy may be at least partly the result of the founding context rather than 
the exogenous impact of the particular form of president-dominant semi-
presidentialism that can be found in these countries. 
 The absence of any statistically significant association between 
cohabitation and poor democratic performance runs counter to the standard 
academic consensus. In part, this may be because cohabitation is a relatively rare 
phenomenon. The association may become stronger as more countries experience 
semi-presidentialism and for longer periods of time. In addition, while 
cohabitation may not be associated with a poorer standard of democracy, there is 
anecdotal evidence to sugges that it does have an impact on the decision-making 
process more generally. For example, in France there have been three periods of 
cohabitation. Each time, it has raised issues in the area of foreign and defence 
policy making and in terms of France’s policy towards the European Union. In 
the most recent period of cohabitation from 1997-2002, competition between 
right-wing President Chirac and left-wing Prime Minister Jospin caused 
particular problems. So, in the aftermath of 9/11 attack on the US President 
Chirac announced on television that France would take part in military 
operations in Afghanistan, whereas the next day the socialist Defence Minister, 
Alain Richard, stated that discussion with the Americans were still ongoing. This 
example indicates that cohabitation should not be ignored as a source of conflict. 
However, it does not provide evidence that it is democratically destabilising. 
 The association between cohabitation and relatively good democratic 
performance may suggest that one of the main arguments in favour of semi-
presidentialism has some basis. The main reason for supporting semi-
presidentialism is because the dual nature of the executive can ensure that power 
is not a zero-sum game and that political actors from competing and/or 
opposing forces may have the opportunity to share power (Lijphart 2004: 102). 
This can give each of them a stake in the system and can help the consolidation 
of democracy. The research strategy in this article was not designed to provide 
evidence to either support or refute this hypothesis. However, the presence of 
cohabitation in the early years of democracy in semi-presidential countries such 
as Bulgaria, Mongolia and Portugal may have helped the process of 
consolidation, even if it was a situation that neither the president nor the prime 
minister actively desired. Thus, while there is a clear association between 
cohabitation and the collapse of democracy in Niger in January 1996, overall 
there is at least some evidence to suggest that far from being problematic 
cohabitation may provide some power-sharing benefits for semi-presidential 
countries. 
 The absence of any significant relationship between minority government 
and poor democratic performance also runs counter to one of the more recent 
arguments against semi-presidentialism. There are individual cases that seem to 
support the problems associated with divided minority government. For 
example, there was minority government in Armenia some time prior to the 
complete collapse of democracy. However, at the time when it was experiencing 
minority government Armenia was classed as a democracy by Polity, rather than 
as an anocracy. Thus, it may be the case that minority government contributed to 
a weakening in the foundations of democracy rather than an immediate decline 
in democratic performance per se. If correct, this point would be consistent with 
Skach’s (2005) study of Weimar Germany. Here, minority government occurred a 
number of years prior to the final collapse of democracy. So, there is no direct 
association between the two. However, Skach argues that divided minority 
government was destabilising and created a general situation that resulted in the 
decline of democracy a few years later. 
There is also a sense in which the impact of divided government may be 
underestimated by the methodology used in this article. For example, in a couple 
of cases – notably Armenia and Belarus – the decline in the countries’ Polity 
scores was swift. Both of these countries went from the status of a democracy to 
an autocracy, and hence exited from the dataset, within the space of one or two 
years. These countries both experienced minority government but they did so 
when they occurred in our dataset as democracies. Thus, minority government 
may have had a negative effect on democratic performance, but it is not captured 
in our dataset because the country did not go through a long-term period of 
anocracy when there was divided minority government. 
In addition, we have used the absence of a legislative majority as our 
proxy for divided minority government. While Skach (2005: 116) states that 
divided minority government is the case where “neither the president nor the 
prime minister has a legislative majority”, she adds that “the president is usually 
also divided against the prime minister” (ibid.) and she calls this the “most 
difficult subtype of the semi-presidential model” (ibid.). This suggest that, for 
Skatch, the most problematic cases are those where there is both cohabitation and 
minority government. Thus, our proxy may not have quite captured the most 
dangerous scenario that Skach idntifies. That said, while 21 per cent of our total 
number of observations were cases of minority government, only 11 observations 
combined cohabitation and minority government. They included short periods in 
France, Weimar Germany and Poland. However, only in Sri Lanka 2003 was it 
also associated with an anocracy. Thus, while Skach may have identified a 
scenario that is potentially problematic, it is also particularly rare in terms of how 
we have defined democracy and anocracy. Altogether, we find no significant 
association between either minority government and poor democratic 
performance or the combination of both cohabitation and minority government 
and poor democratic performance. 
Overall, the findings for minority government are not sensitive to the 
inclusion of particular countries. Indeed, the dataset provides no evidence at all 
for the negative effect of minority government. Certainly, more work needs to be 
conducted on the potentially negative effects of divided minority government, 
but no support is found for any such effects in this article. 
 
Conclusion 
 This article has demonstrated that the conventional wisdom about semi-
presidentialism needs to be reconsidered. We do not claim that semi-
presidentialism should be adopted or that semi-presidentialism is a better  
constitutional choice than either presidentialism or parliamentarism. However, 
we have demonstrated that there is no evidence to support two of three main 
arguments against semi-presidentialism, namely those that emphasise the 
supposedly harmful effects of cohabitation and divided minority government. 
There are individual cases where these situations have led more or less directly 
to a decline in democratic performance or even a collapse of democracy. Overall, 
though, there is no significant relationship between either of these two situations 
and democratic performance. 
By contrast, we have shown that there is strong evidence to support the 
conventional wisdom that semi-presidential countries with strong presidents are 
likely to be associated with poor democratic performance. The importance of this 
finding lies in more than just the statistical confirmation of a received wisdom 
that was previously based on anecdotal evidence. We have demonstrated that 
academics need to pay more attention to studying the effects of different types of 
semi-presidentialism. In this context, we have also demonstrated that 
constitution builders have a choice as to which type of semi-presidentialism to 
adopt. If constitution builders wish to adopt semi-presidentialism or if politically 
they have no option but to adopt semi-presidentialism, then the advice to them is 
clear. If you must choose semi-presidentialism, then choose a form of semi-
presidentialism where the president has very few powers. 
 In October 2007 Turkish voters approved a constitutional amendment 
introducing a semi-presidential system. More than that, they approved the 
introduction of semi-presidentialism in a system where the president is a 
powerful figure. The findings of this article suggest that this form of semi-
presidentialism is associated with poorer democratic performance than the 
situation where the semi-presidential president is more of a figurehead. 
Assuming the findings of this article are correct, then, all else equal, we predict a 
decline in the future performance of Turkish democracy. 
Figure 1 
Countries with semi-presidential constitutions, 2008 
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Figure 2 
Semi-presidential case selection and power of the president 
 
State Years SP and Polity +1-+9 
inc. (to 2004) 
Siaroff score 
Armenia 1991-1995 6 
Armenia 1998-2004 6 
Austria 1929-1932 1 
Austria 1945-2004 1 
Belarus 1994 7 
Bulgaria 1992-2004 3 
Burkina Faso 1978-1979 5 
Central African Republic 1993-2002 6 
Comoros 1992-1994  6 
Comoros 1996-1998 6 
Congo (Brazzaville) 1992-1996 7 
Croatia 1999-2004 6 (1990-2000) 
4 (2001-) 
East Timor 2002-2004 4 
Finland 1919-2004 5 (1919-56) 
6 (1956-94) 
5 (1995-2000) 
2 (2001-) 
France 1963-2004 7 
Germany 1919-1932 5 
Guinea-Bissau 1994-1997 6 
Guinea-Bissau 1999-2002 6 
Haiti 1994-1999 5 
Ireland 1937-2004 3 
Lithuania 1992-2004 4 
Macedonia 1992-2004 4 
Madagascar 1991-2004 7 
Mali 1992-2004 7 
Moldova 1991-2000 5 
Mongolia 1992-2004 4 
Mozambique 1994-2004 8 
Namibia 1990-2004 7 
Niger 1993-1995 6 
Niger 1999-2004 6 
Peru 1980-1991 7 
Peru 1993-1999 7 
Peru 2001-2004 7 
Poland 1990-2004 6 (1990-1997) 
3 (1998-) 
Portugal 1976-2004 6 (1976-82) 
3 (1983-) 
Romania 1990-2004 5 
Russia 1992-2004 7 
Senegal 2000-2004 7 
Slovakia 1999-2004 2 
Slovenia 1992-2004 1 
South Korea 1988-2004 6 
Sri Lanka 1978-2004 7 
Taiwan 1996-2004 5 
Tanzania 2000-2004 7 
Ukraine 1991-2004 6 (1991-96) 
7 (1997-) 
  
Table 1 
Presidential powers in semi-presidential countries not measured by Siaroff 
 
 PE CE AP CM VT EDP FP GF DL 
Tot
al 
Burkina Faso (1978-79) 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 5 
Congo (Brazzaville) 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 
East Timor 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 
Haiti 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 6 
Niger (1993-95) 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 6 
Niger (1999-) 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 6 
Senegal 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 7 
Tanzania 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 7 
 
PE = popularly elected; CE = concurrent presidential and legislative elections; AP 
= discretionary appointments powers; CM = chairs cabinet meetings; VT = veto 
power; EDP = long-term emergency or decree powers; FP = central role in 
foreign policy; GF = central role in government formation; DL = ability to 
dissolve the legislature 
Scores based on the indicators in Siaroff (2003). 
Table 2 
Logit analyses of semi-presidentialism and democratic performance 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model  3 Model 4 
GDP  per capita 
(log) 
.6808362   
(.2055956)*** 
1.237859   
(.3247162)*** 
.71148   
(.2246848)*** 
.6119003    
(.214031)*** 
Population (log) 
.4383833 
(.1371166)*** 
.6274666   
(.1759641)*** 
.4710251   
(.1375393)*** 
.3721635   
(.1221582)*** 
ENPP 
-.2056949 
(.0639256)*** 
-.2617906 
(.075152)*** 
-.2004184 
(.0655849)*** 
-.1687332 
(.0650723)** 
Ethnic 
Fractionalisation 
2.20831 
(.9067769)** 
.805963 
(.7668171) 
2.187855 
(.9098846)** 
1.872118 
(.9400107)** 
Europe 
.5224004 
(.5407825) 
-1.609927 
(.9000481)* 
.2982547 
(.5446071) 
.4923391 
(.501445) 
Post-Cold War 
.6877843 
(.2868311)** 
1.252883 
(.3952456)*** 
.6836351 
(.3054764)** 
.8604316 
(.323043)*** 
Presidential 
Power 
-.5531349 
(.1609281)*** 
-.8413591 
(.253391)*** 
-.6627578 
(.1569704)*** 
- 
Weak 
presidency 
- - - 
3.600201 
(1.073047)*** 
Moderately 
powerful 
presidency 
- - - 
1.106427 
(.4180356)*** 
Cohabitation 
2.279 
(1.061557)** 
- 
2.237859 
(1.063553)* 
2.39425 
(1.094341)** 
DMG 
.2509067 
(.3550725) 
1.192655 
(.4348611)*** 
.1846341 
(.3523154) 
.1944635 
(.3677623) 
Constant 
-6.41452 
(1.706287)*** 
-9.195045 
(2.195886)*** 
-6.182103 
(1.756497)*** 
-9.113723 
(2.082399)*** 
Observations 393 331 393 393 
Chi2 60.05*** 50.77*** 63.89*** 56.50*** 
Notes: Cell entries are coefficients with Newey-West standard errors in 
parentheses set for a maximum lag of one.  *Denotes p<0.10. ** Denotes p<0.05. 
*** Denotes p<0.01.  In model 2, cohabitation perfectly predicts the dependent 
variable and has been dropped from the equation. 
  
  Notes 
                                                 
1 See (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/. 
2 Communication from Monty Marshall, one of the authors of the Polity project. 
3 The reliability of at least one of Siaroff’s scores must be questioned. For 
example, in Ireland the president does not have the right to veto legislation, yet 
Siaroff’s measures indicate that this is the case. In Ireland, the president has the 
right to send a bill to the Supreme Court for its constitutionality to be judged. So, 
Siaroff’s score for Ireland should be 2, not 3. 
4 Available at: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/
0,,contentMDK:20699744~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00
.html 
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